CONSTITUTIONAL LAW<\/span><\/h1>\n

A.K. Gopalan Case (1950):\u00a0 SC contended that there was no violation of Fundamental Rights enshrined in Articles 13, 19, 21 and 22 under the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act if the detention was as per the procedure established by law. Here, the SC took a narrow view of Article 21.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Shankari Prasad Case (1951): This case dealt with the amenability of Fundamental Rights (the First Amendment\u2019s validity was challenged). The SC contended that the Parliament\u2019s power to amend under Article 368 also includes the power to amend the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Berubari Union case (1960): This case was regarding the Parliament\u2019s power to transfer the territory of Berubai to Pakistan. The Supreme Court examined Article 3 in detail and held that the Parliament cannot make laws under this article in order to execute the Nehru-Noon agreement. Hence, the 9th Amendment Act was passed to enforce the agreement.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Golaknath case (1967): The questions, in this case, were whether the amendment is a law; and whether Fundamental Rights can be amended or not. SC contented that Fundamental Rights are not amenable to the Parliamentary restriction as stated in Article 13 and that to amend the Fundamental rights a new Constituent Assembly would be required. Also stated that Article 368 gives the procedure to amend the Constitution but does not confer on Parliament the power to amend the Constitution.<\/span><\/p>\n

Kesavananda Bharati case (1973): This judgement defined the basic structure of the Constitution. The SC held that although no part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, was beyond the Parliament\u2019s amending power, the \u201cbasic structure of the Constitution could not be abrogated even by a constitutional amendment.\u201d This is the basis in Indian law in which the judiciary can strike down any amendment passed by Parliament that is in conflict with the basic structure of the Constitution.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain case (1975): The SC applied the theory of basic structure and struck down Clause(4) of article 329-A, which was inserted by the 39th Amendment in 1975 on the grounds that it was beyond the Parliament\u2019s amending power as it destroyed the Constitution\u2019s basic features.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Maneka Gandhi case (1978): A main issue, in this case, was whether the right to go abroad is a part of the Right to Personal Liberty under Article 21. The SC held that it is included in the Right to Personal Liberty.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Minerva Mills case (1980): This case again strengthens the Basic Structure doctrine. The judgement struck down 2 changes made to the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act 1976, declaring them to be violative of the basic structure.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Waman Rao Case (1981): The SC again reiterated the Basic Structure doctrine. It also drew a line of demarcation as April 24th, 1973 i.e., the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgement, and held that it should not be applied retrospectively to reopen the validity of any amendment to the Constitution which took place prior to that date.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Shah Bano Begum case (1985): Milestone case for Muslim women\u2019s fight for rights. The SC upheld the right to alimony for a Muslim woman and said that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is applicable to all citizens irrespective of their religion.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

MC Mehta and Union Of India (1986): This case dealt with 3 issues: Scope of Article 32; the rule of Absolute Liability or Rylands vs Fletcher to be followed; the issue of compensation. SC held that its power under Article 32 is not restricted to preventive measures, but also remedial measures when rights are violated. It also held that in the case of industries engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities, Absolute Liability was to be followed.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Indra Sawhney and Union of India (1992): SC examined the scope and extent of Article 16(4), which provides for the reservation of jobs in favour of backward classes. It upheld the constitutional validity of 27% reservation for the OBCs with certain conditions (like creamy layer exclusion, no reservation in promotion, the total reserved quota should not exceed 50%, etc.)<\/span><\/p>\n

R. Bommai case (1994): In this judgement, the SC tried to curb the blatant misuse of Article 356 (regarding the imposition of the President\u2019s Rule on states).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Vishaka and State of Rajasthan (1997): This case dealt with sexual harassment at the workplace. In the judgement, the SC gave a set of guidelines for employers \u2013 as well as other responsible persons or institutions \u2013 to immediately ensure the prevention of sexual harassment.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Samatha and State of Andhra Pradesh (1997): This judgement nullified all mining leases granted by the Andhra Pradesh State government in the Scheduled areas and asked it to stop all mining operations. It declared that forest land, tribal land, and government land in scheduled areas could not be leased to private companies or non-tribal for industrial operations. Such activity is only permissible to a government undertaking and tribal people.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Lily Thomas v Union of India (2000): Here, the SC held that the second marriage of a Hindu man without divorcing the first wife, even if the man had converted to Islam, is void unless the first marriage had been dissolved according to the Hindu Marriage Act.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Aruna Shanbaug Case (2011): The SC ruled that individuals had a right to die with dignity, allowing passive euthanasia with guidelines. The need to reform India\u2019s laws on euthanasia was triggered by the tragic case of Aruna Shanbaug who lay in a vegetative state (blind, paralysed and deaf) for 42 years.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Lily Thomas VS UOI:\u00a0 The SC ruled that any MLA, MLC or MP who was found guilty of a crime and given a minimum of 2 year imprisonment would cease to be a member of the House with immediate effect.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nirbhaya Case (2012): Introduction of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 and definition of rape under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Code of Criminal Procedures, 1973.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

National Legal Services Authority and Union of India (2014): This case resulted in the recognition of transgender persons as a third gender. The SC also instructed the government to treat them as minorities and expand the reservations in education, jobs, education, etc.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Triple Talaq Judgement (2016): The SC outlawed the backward practice of instant \u2018triple talaq\u2019, which permitted Muslim men to unilaterally end their marriages by uttering the word \u201ctalaq\u201d three times without making any provision for maintenance or alimony.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

L Chandra Kumar Case (1997): The SC ruled that the power of judicial review vested in the Supreme Court and High Courts by Articles 32 and 226 respectively is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.<\/span><\/p>\n

Puttuswamy Case (2017): This SC judgement protects individual rights against the invasion of one\u2019s privacy.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Romesh Thapar Case (1950): Here, the SC held that the freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas that can only be ensured by circulation.<\/span><\/p>\n

IPC<\/span><\/h1>\n

State of Maharashtra v. M.H. George (1965):<\/span><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court of India in the 1965 case decided on the issue as to whether a foreigner committing an offence within the Indian territory be held liable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or not.\u00a0 It decides that they will be held liable for such an offence.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Central Bank of India Ltd v. Ram Narain (1955):<\/span><\/p>\n

The issue before the Supreme Court of India was concerning the liability of a foreigner who had obtained Indian citizenship after committing an offence as a foreigner. Then such action will ipso facto not make the person criminally liable for his commitment, even if Indian law recognizes it as an offence.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

M .V. Elizabeth and Others v. Harwan Investment and Trading Private Limited (1992):<\/span><\/p>\n

A landmark case of the admiralty jurisdiction which had come up before the Supreme Court of India. The two issues that the Court took note of in this case were;<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
1. Whether the local courts have the admiralty jurisdiction that extends to arresting foreign vessels in cases where the claim rests in a foreign land?<\/span><\/li>\n
2. Whether international conventions that concern the arrest of ships and have not been ratified by India, bound India or not?<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

   In deciding these issues, the Apex Court held that the residence of the defendant, or the nationality the ship holds, will stand irrelevant if a maritime claim is made under the admiralty jurisdiction of any High Court of India.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Republic of Italy through the Ambassador & Ors v. Union of India (2013):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Supreme Court of India while deciding in the case o ruled that India will always be entitled to the right to exercise its sovereignty under both Municipal, and Public International laws up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline which is the determining criteria for the jurisdiction over territorial waters. In the present case, firing happened by two Italian vessels on the Indian vessel which was within the territorial water limit of India. Because of this, the Italian vessels were charged under the Indian penal provisions.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   CRPC<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The case primarily dealt with the suspension of the internet in the State of Jammu and Kashmir post revocation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India, however, one of the issues in the case was regarding the excessive imposition of Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which empowers a magistrate to impose restrictions on movement and speech in areas where trouble could erupt. The Supreme Court of India, in this case, held that Section 144 CrPC cannot be used as a tool to prevent legitimate expression of opinion. <\/span>Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh (2020)\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Abhilasha v. Parkash and Ors. (2020):\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   In the present case, the Supreme Court of India, held that an unmarried Hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father till she gets married under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, however, such daughter must prove that she is not able to maintain herself.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020<\/span>):\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   In this case, the petitioner, who is also a journalist, hosted and anchored a religious debate, which led to the registration of at least 7 First Information Reports (FIR) against him. The petitioner in this case eventually reached the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Most of the punitive sections are concerned with infringing the religious sentiments of a community, including Section 153B and Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court of India in this case came heavily on the difference between hate speech and free speech, the need for criminalizing hate speech and the tests to determine hate speech.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Laxmibai Chandaragi B v. State of Karnataka (2021):<\/span><\/p>\n

   In the said case, the father of the petitioner filed a police complaint alleging that his daughter is missing. During the investigation, it was found that the daughter of the complainant had married a man out of her own will. Despite being aware of the wedlock of the petitioner, the investigating officer (IO) in this case, instead of taking the statement of the petitioner in her place of residence, insisted on recording her statements at the police station. The Apex court, in this case, came heavily on the conduct of the IO and other police authorities. The court further held that there is no need for consent of the clan, family, or community in the cases where two adults have voluntarily decided to enter into a wedlock.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   CPC<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (2020):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The case is an appeal case brought before the Supreme Court of India to challenge a judgment delivered by the Gujarat High Court that declared a suit filed by the appellate to be barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The concerned suit revolved around an agricultural plot of land which was sold by the appellate to the respondent who failed to pay the consideration of the sale deed in 2009 thereby forcing the appellate to cancel the same along with the filing of a suit against the respondent on 15th December 2014. The Court took into account Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and based on the facts in this case, the suit will be barred by the prescribed limitation.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   H.S. Goutham v. Rama Murthy (2021):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The present case (2021) of an appeal involves a mortgagee and an auction purchaser who had purchased the mortgaged property in concern. The defendant, in this case, had defaulted in making the entire payment to the appellate in consequence of which the latter instituted a suit for recovering the payment from the latter. Further, a compromise took place between the appellate and the defendant where the latter agreed to pay the amount in installments over three years. A sale certificate was also granted to the auction purchaser thereby registering the sale. The court held that if Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code of 1908 is read with Order 21 Rule 94 of the Code what can be obtained is that once the sale has been confirmed along with the issue of the sale certificate in favor of the purchaser, the same becomes final, and therefore cannot be set aside.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Arvind Jeram Kotecha v. Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha (2020):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Bombay High Court while deciding on the case took into consideration Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which provides grounds when a foreign judgment is not conclusive. The Court stated that a bare reading of the provision reflects that for an order or a decree to be conclusive by nature, the same must have been obtained after a due judicial process that will include providing reasonable notice, and equal opportunities to the parties in the suit to be heard. The executing court will therefore not be able to enquire into the legality of the judgment if it follows a judicial process. <\/span>EVIDENCE ACT<\/span><\/p>\n

   EVIDENCE ACT<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Bhimsha Subanna Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (1996):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Bombay High Court in light of the case of Bhimsha Subanna Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (1996) took into consideration the circumstances when independent evidence is not available to the Court to carry on with the conviction of the accused. In this present case, the Hon\u2019ble High Court while concluding that in the absence of independent evidence, the Court has to carefully examine evidence by the police witnesses which, if found to be a reliable source, will form the basis on which the conviction of the accused will exist. Thus, where assault weapons were discovered in line with the accused statement and no evidence existed which would reflect on the animosity that existed between the police inspector and the accused, it will be justified, and safe to believe the statement of the inspector which has been uncorroborated in respect of the weapon discovered.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v. Ashutosh Agnihotri and Anr. (2011):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Supreme Court of India in the case took note of the fact as to why hearsay evidence is not considered relevant evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The fundamentals of evidence law state that hearsay evidence is inadmissible in a court of law on grounds that the same is inaccurate and vague by its very nature. If hearsay evidence is permitted by the courts, then the same facilitates ample room for fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence to take place, which stands unjust for the party against whom the evidence is laid down.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v.\u00a0 Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and Ors (2020):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The SC observed that it has been a settled legal principle that the Evidence Act prohibits the proof of an electronic record by means of oral evidence if the requirements provided under the statutory provision of Section 65B of the Act are not complied or abided by. Establishing the friendly connection between the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Indian Evidence Act, of 1872, the Court held that Section 65B of the latter has been a complete Code by itself, and therefore the former legislation and the statutory provision of the Evidence Act behaves as legal machinery against technological overpowering.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   ADR<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Haryana Space Application Centre (HARSAC) and Anr. v. Pan India Consultants Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., January (2021)<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that, under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 read with the Seventh Schedule, the nomination of the Principal Secretary, Government of Haryana as the nominee arbitrator of the appellant, which was a nodal agency of the Government of Haryana, was unlawful. It was pointed out that under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act, any individual whose connection with the parties falls into any of the categories listed in the Seventh Schedule is ineligible to be chosen as an arbitrator, regardless of any prior agreement to the contrary.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Indus Biotech Pvt. Ltd. v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund, (2021)<\/span><\/p>\n

   The <\/span>Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court clarified, while summarising the procedure, that in any proceeding pending before the NCLT under Section 7 of the IBC if such petition is admitted upon the NCLT recording the satisfaction with regard to the default and the debt due from the corporate debtor, any subsequent application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act will not be maintainable. A<\/span><\/p>\n

   Secunderabad Cantonment Board v B. Ramachandraiah & Sons:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The current case includes appeals stemming from petitions filed under Section 11 of the 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Secunderabad Cantonment Board, the appellant, had issued a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) for a contract to rehabilitate roads. The Appellant and the respondent, B. Ramachandraiah and Sons, signed three agreements in accordance with the NIT. The question, in this case, was whether sending letters\/correspondences would prolong the time limit for filing a Section 11 petition and if the court may dismiss the petition because it was The Supreme Court ruled that the statute of limitations began to run on and from February 12, 2007. Even though the beginning point for restriction on merits was 16.02.2010, which was 30 days after the Appellant\u2019s first refusal of the appointment of an arbitrator, and a period of three years had elapsed by February 2013, the claim on merits was determined to be hopelessly time-barred. As a result, the Supreme Court determined that the High Court could not have chosen an arbitrator. As a result, the appeals were granted.<\/span><\/p>\n

   FAMILY LAW<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others:<\/span><\/p>\n

   Supreme Court in 2017 in a historic and landmark judgment declared \u201cTriple Talaq\u201d unconstitutional. The Apex Court said, \u201cGiven the fact triple talaq is instant and irrevocable, it has no scope of arbitration which is essential for saving marriage ties. Hence, it is clear that this form of Talaq is manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save it. The s) was most inappropriate.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Sarla Mudgal vs. Union of India:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Court held that if a Hindu converts to Muslim and then has a second marriage, he can not do so, irrespective of the fact that polygamy is allowed in Islamic Law.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Chanmuniya\u00a0 v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha:<\/span><\/p>\n

   Considering Sec 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 the marriage performed in absence of customary rites and ceremonies of either party to the marriage is not valid. And the Mere intention of the parties to live together as husband and wife is not enough.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Supreme Court, in this case, held that Live-in relationships will also come under Domestic Violence Act 2005. It is held that not all live-in relationships will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Seema v. Ashwani Kumar, AIR 2006 S.C 1158\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Supreme Court in this case directed the State Governments and the Central Government that marriages of all persons who are citizens of India belonging to various religious denominations should be made compulsorily registerable in their respective States where such marriages are solemnized.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (Supreme Court):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Supreme Court held that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation. The Court also stated that such proceedings can also be conducted through video conferencing.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Natubhai Somabhai Rohit v. State of Gujrat & Anr. (Gujrat High Court):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Court also relied on the Supreme Court\u2019s verdict in G. V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad wherein the Court stated that a complaint relating to a matrimonial dispute where all the members are roped into irrespective of role, becomes liable to be quashed.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India (1999) 2 SCC 228:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   It is pertinent to note that sub-section (c) of Section 4 provides that a natural guardian means a guardian mentioned in Section 6. This definition section, however obviously in accordance with the rule of interpretation of the statute, ought to be read subject to Section 6 being one of the basic provisions of the Act and it is this Section 6 which records that the natural guardian of a Hindu minor, in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl, is the father and after him the mother.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Nachhattar Singh v. Harcharan Kaur (1996):<\/span><\/p>\n

   If both the parties had voluntarily consented to file the petition for dissolving the marriage by mutual consent and all the other conditions mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of S. 13B of the Act are fulfilled, it will not be open to a party to withdraw the consent. In the present case without making an inquiry under sub-sec. (2) the trial Court has dismissed the petition as withdrawn which could not be done merely on the asking of one party.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, 1 (1991) DMC 313 (SC):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The SC settled the controversy by ruling that at the time of second motion under Section 13(B) HMA, one of the parties of the marriage withdrew the consent given to the petition, then decree for divorce on mutual consent cannot be passed.<\/span><\/p>\n

   PIL<\/span><\/h1>\n

   MC. Mehta & Another v. Union of India & Others AIR 1987 SC 1086:<\/p>\n

   This PIL was filed after the oleum gas leak from Shriram Food and Fertilisers Ltd. complex at Delhi. The Court laid down the concept of absolute liability.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and Others AIR 1978 SC 1675:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The case was with respect to reforms related to prisoner\u2019s rights. There is no total deprivation of a prisoner\u2019s rights of life and liberty. Court went further into the right to be protected from torture and the right to speedy execution.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180:<\/span><\/p>\n

   Supreme Court has held that the right to livelihood is included in the right to life because no person can live without the means of living i.e. the means of livelihood. This is the street vendors\u2019 case.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Citizens for Democracy v. State of Assam & Others (1995) 3 SCC 743:<\/span><\/p>\n

   Handcuffing and chaining in public shall be shunned as violative of human dignity within and without prison.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Laxmi v. Union of India (2013) 9 SCALE 290:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The PIL highlighted the need for stringent regulations under the Poison Act, 1919 in respect of acid attacks on women. The Supreme Court gave measures for the proper treatment, aftercare and rehabilitation of the victims of acid attacks and the needs of acid attack victims, and compensation payable to acid victims by state or the creation of a separate fund for payment of compensation to the acid attack victims.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India (2013) 7 SCALE 507:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Supreme Court issued a direction that in case a complaint with regard to any missing children was made in a police station, the same must be reduced into an FIR and appropriate steps should be taken to see that follow up investigation was taken up immediately.<\/span><\/p>\n

   ADMINISTRATIVE LAW<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Air India vs Nargesh Meerza (1981):<\/span><\/p>\n

   A regulatory provision which was framed by Air India provided the terms and conditions which held that in case the Air-Hostess would be pregnant, she would be terminated from the service. It was thereafter held that in such a case, there would be a violation of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the air hostess. It was held that such a law would be violative of the constitution and hence is arbitrary in nature.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Narendra Kumar vs State of Uttar Pradesh:<\/span><\/p>\n

   In this case, the ordinance-making power was challenged. It was held that instead of making multiple ordinances when the Parliament is not in session, it would be better if one would spare some time and make an Act or Legislation which would have a binding nature for all. This was done so that there could not be misuse of the power in the hands of executive officers.<\/span><\/p>\n

   PROFESSIONAL ETHICS<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Narain Pandey vs. Pannalal Pandey (2013) 11 SCC 435:<\/span><\/p>\n

   An advocate who is found guilty of having filed vakalatnamas without authority and then filing false and fictitious compromises on behalf of the client without any authority deserves punishment proportionate to the degree of misconduct. Such punishment must meet two objectives- deterrence and correction. The Court referred to the Preamble of the BCI Rules- Chapter II while adjudging the misconduct.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Shambhuram Yadav vs. Hanumandas Khatri AIR 2001 SC 2509:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The lawyer suggested that his client give a bribe to the judge to get the suit decided in his favour. The Supreme Court held the lawyer guilty of professional misconduct. (Violation of Rules 3 and 4 of BCI Rules- \u2013 Chapter II)<\/span><\/p>\n

   ENVIRONMENTAL LAW<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Damodar Rao v. S.O. Municipal Corporation AIR 1987 AP 171:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Apex court held that the environmental pollution and spoliation which is slowly poisoning and polluting the atmosphere should also be regarded as amounting to a violation of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Municipal Corporation, Ratlam vs. Vardhichand AIR 1980 SC 1622:<\/span><\/p>\n

   When the Directive Principles of State Policy has clear statutory expressions the plea of lack of funds will be a poor alibi when people in misery cry for justice.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India AIR 1999 SC 1502:<\/span><\/p>\n

   SC held that the financial costs of preventing or remedying damage caused by pollution should lie with the undertakings which cause the pollution by adopting the \u201cPolluter Pays Principle\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

   M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India AIR 1988 SCR (2) 538:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The writ petition filed by the activist advocate M.C. Mehta in the Supreme Court highlighted the pollution of the Ganga river by the hazardous industries located on its banks. Justice ES Venkataramiah gave a historic judgement in ordering the closure of a number of polluting tanneries near Kanpur.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Animal Welfare Board of India vs. A. Nagaraj and Ors. (2014) 7 SCC 547(<\/span>Jallikattu):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court prohibited Jallikattu and other animal races and fights. The court alluded to section 3 and section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and declared that animal fights incited by humans are illegal, even those carried out under the guise of tradition and culture.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India (Taj Trapezium Case) AIR 1987:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Apex Court in delivered its historic judgment in 1996 giving various directions including banning the use of coal and cake and directing the industries to Compressed Natural Gas (CNG).<\/span><\/p>\n

   Subhash Kumar vs. State of Bihar and Ors. (1991):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Right to Pollution Free Environment was declared to be a part of Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   CYBER LAW<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Shreya Singhal Vs UOI AIR 2015 SC 1523:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   The two women were arrested under Section 66A of the IT Act, alleged to have posted objectionable comments on Facebook regarding the complete shutdown of Mumbai after the demise of a political leader. The SC removed an arbitrary provision from IT Act, 2000 and upheld citizens\u2019 fundamental right to free speech in India. It was of the view that even though section 66A is struck down, provisions in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 will continue to be applicable.<\/span><\/p>\n

   State of Tamil Nadu Vs SuhasKatti CC No. 4680 of 2004:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   The accused was the victim\u2019s family friend and wanted to marry her but she married another man which resulted in a divorce. He opened a false e-mail account in the victim’s name and posted obscene, defamatory, and annoying information about the victim. Chargesheet was filed under Section 67 of the IT Act and Section 469 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against the accused. Decision The accused was convicted under Section 469 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 67 of the IT Act by Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. He was punished with a Rigorous Imprisonment of 2 years along with a fine of Rs. 500 under Section 469 of the IPC, Simple Imprisonment of 1 year along with a fine of Rs. 500 under Section 509 of the IPC, and Rigorous Imprisonment of 2 years along with a fine of Rs. 4,000 under Section 67 of the IT Act. The present case is a landmark case in Cyber Law as it ensured efficient handling of the case by making conviction possible within 7 months from filing the FIR.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Avnish Bajaj Vs State (NCT) of Delhi (2008) 150 DLT 769:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   In this case, Avnish Bajaj, the CEO of Bazee.com, was arrested for screening cyber pornography under Section 67 of the IT Act. Someone else, however, was using the Bazee.com website to sell copies of a CD containing pornographic material. Decision Mr. Bajaj was not involved in the airing of pornographic content, according to the court. Such material could not be read on the Bazee.com website, which receives a commission and makes money from sales and adverts made on its pages. The court points out that the evidence gathered demonstrates that the cyber pornographic offence was committed by someone other than Bazee.com. The CEO has granted bail on the condition that two sureties of Rs1 lakh each be provided. However, the onus is on the accused to show that he was only a service provider and not a content creator.<\/span><\/p>\n

   LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL LAWS<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Syndicate Bank and Ors v. K. Umesh Nayak, 1995 AIR 319, 1994 SCC (5) 572:<\/span><\/p>\n

   In this case, the major issue before the Supreme Court was whether the workmen were to get paid during the period of strike despite the fact that the strike was legal or illegal. The SC held that the strike is a result of a long struggle between the employer and the employee. It is the last weapon available to the employees in order to allow their demands to be fulfilled by the industry. The court ordered the employer to pay the workers for the \u201cstrike period\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Excel Wear v. Union of India, 1979:<\/span><\/p>\n

   In this case, Excel Wear is a garment manufacturing firm\/petitioner having 400 employed workers in its firm. The relationship between the employer and employee deteriorated as the workers became very militant and aggressive. The petitioner approached the government-respondent for the closure of the undertaking. The Government disallowed the closure of the undertaking. Aggrieved from the order of the government\/respondent, the appellant approached the Supreme Court of India. The apex court held that the right to business is not equal to the carry on business as both things can\u2019t go together. The court further held that the right to close the business is not an absolute one and can be restricted and regulated by the legal provisions. The Court added that the employer\u2019s life can\u2019t be put at risk.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Randhir Singh v. Union of India, 1982 AIR 879:<\/span><\/p>\n

   In this case, petitioner Randhir Singh was a driver working with the Delhi Police Force. He claimed that his salary was not as per standard as the other drivers working in the Delhi Administration. The apex court while dealing with the matter said that the Constitution of India doesn\u2019t include the provisions for equal pay, and so it can\u2019t be kept under the ambit of the fundamental right. However, Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India provides the provision for equal pay for equal work for both man and woman, and it is included under the Directive Principles of the State Policy. The apex court construed the principle of equal pay for equal work.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   LAW OF TORT<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Rylands v. Fletcher (1868):<\/span><\/p>\n

   In this case, the defendants, who were the mill owners in the coal mining area of Lancashire, decided to construct a reservoir on their land. When the reservoir was constructed and water was filled, the water broke through the filled-in shaft of an abandoned coal mine. It flooded the connected passageways and the plaintiff\u2019s active mine nearby was destroyed. The House of Lords held that the judgement of the court of the Exchequer Chamber held the defendants to be liable. The court also established the doctrine of \u2018strict liability\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

   Damnum sine injuria\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

   The defendant, in this case, was a school teacher at the Gloucester Grammar School. Due to some reason, he decided to quit his job and start his own school. He opened his own school in the vicinity of the Gloucester Grammar School and kept the fee at 12 pence to entice students to come to his school at such a low fee. The fee charged by his previous school was 40 pence. He was also very popular among the students. Because of these reasons, many students left Gloucester and joined his school. This caused a lot of monetary damage to Gloucester Grammar School. Hence, the owner of Gloucester Grammar School filed a suit against the defendant for the recovery of the financial loss he had to incur because of him. The Court held that the defendant was not liable to compensate the plaintiff for the damage caused and the Gloucester Grammar School had no cause against the defendant. The case falls under \u2018damnum sine injuria\u2019, i.e. there may be financial damage caused to the plaintiff but there was no legal injury. T<\/span><\/p>\n

   Bhim Singh v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir (1985):<\/span><\/p>\n

   Principle used:<\/b> Injuria sine damnum and false imprisonment<\/span><\/p>\n

   The petitioner, in this case, Shri Bhim Singh was a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. He was arrested and detained by the police. Also, he was deliberately prevented from attending the session of the Assembly. As a result of a habeas corpus writ filed by his wife, Bhim Singh was released on bail. The main principle applied here was that of \u2018injuria sine damnum\u2019, i.e. injury without damage. Even though there was no damage caused as the candidate in whose favour he wanted to vote had won, there was an infringement of his legal right. Thus, without any actual harm suffered by the petitioner, he could bring an action just because his constitutional right had been violated.<\/span><\/p>\n

   CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW<\/span><\/h1>\n

   M\/S Imperia Structures Ltd. Vs. Anil Patni On 2 November 2020:<\/span><\/p>\n

   On November 2, 2020, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal against an order issued by the National Consumer Dispute Resolution Council in which the NCDRC\u2019s jurisdiction to hear the complaint was challenged due to the registration under the Real Estate Regulation Act (RERA). The Supreme Court held that the remedies available under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 are additional remedies over and above all other remedies available, including those made available under any special legislation, and that the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 being considered.<\/span><\/p>\n

    <\/p>\n

   Poonam Verma vs Ashwin Patel & Ors on 10 May 1996:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The National Consumer Forum ruled that the doctor was negligent in giving Pramod Verma strong antibiotics for Viral Fever and then for Typhoid Fever without first confirming the diagnosis with a blood test or a urine examination. The Court relied on provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act of 1956 and the Maharashtra Medical Council Act, which state that a person cannot practise medicine in any state unless he has the necessary qualifications and is registered as a Medical Practitioner. Ayurveda, Unani, Homeopathy, and the Biochemic System of Medicine are not included in the definition of medical practitioner. The Supreme Court ruled that anyone who does not know a particular system of medicine but practises in that system is guilty of medical negligence.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Indian Medical Association vs V.P. Shantha & Ors on 13 November 1995:<\/span><\/p>\n

   A three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court held that service rendered to a patient by a medical practitioner by way of consultation, diagnosis, and treatment, both medicinal and surgical, would fall within the ambit of \u2018service\u2019 as defined in Section 2(1) (o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Deficiency in service has to be judged by applying the test of reasonable skill and care which is applicable in action for damages for negligence.<\/span><\/p>\n

   LAW OF CONTRACTS<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Balfour v. Balfour (1919):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The 1919 case of Balfour v. Balfour was the foundation for the contract law as it gave birth to the purpose behind the creation of the legal reaction theory in contract law. A contract cannot be enforceable by nature if the parties to the same do not intend to create legal relations with each other.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Harvey v. Facey (1893):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The difference between an \u201cinvitation to offer\u201d, and \u201coffer\u201d has been laid down by the Lords of Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the appeal in this case. It is further stated that for a contract to be valid, a proposal and an acceptance are needed and to make the contract binding.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemist (1953):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The case of Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemist (1953) revolves specifically around the concept of \u201cinvitation to offer\u201d. The Court reasoned that displaying medicines to the customers will be treated as an \u201cinvitation to treat\u201d, and not as an \u201coffer\u201d.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Durga Prasad v. Baldeo (1880):<\/span><\/p>\n

   In this case, the Court referred to the doctrine of rule of law that is inherently related to Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 2(d) read with Section 25 of the Act of 1872 states that \u201cany agreement without consideration is void\u201d. Thus when the legislation itself clears the necessities of a valid agreement, there cannot exist any case which walks against the statutory rules.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Raghava Chariar v. Srinivara (1916):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The issue in the present case of Raghava Chariar\u00a0 v. Srinivara (1916), the issue that appeared before the Madras High Court was whether a mortgage that had been executed in favor of a minor who had also advanced the mortgage money in totality, would be deemed to be enforceable by him or by any other person on his behalf, or not. It facilitated in providing a divergent scope of safeguarding minors in the contracts.<\/span><\/p>\n

   NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Dalmia Cements v. Galaxy Trading Agencies:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The case is one of the cases whose judgment became a landmark for the Supreme Court, in this case, reasoning behind the enactment of Section 138 of the Negotiable and Instruments Act, the 1881 was given. The facts of the case revolve around dishonouring of the cheque because of which notice was issued to inform the accused.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Canara Bank v. Canara Sales Corporation:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The case of Canara Bank v. Canara Sales Corporation (1987) serves as a basis of understanding the relationship shared between the banker and its customers that are tied with threads of duties and equity, during the times of negligence by either party or in case either party is involved with fraudulent activities. The Court highlighted that there was negligence on the part of both the creditor as well as the debtor but the beam balance of negligence weighed more for the banker than the company. Thus, mere negligence on the part of the bank cannot be a ground for not using the same. The court finally ruled that the company is eligible for compensation thereby dismissing the case.<\/span><\/p>\n

   M\/s Meters and Instruments Private Limited & Anr. v. Kanchan Mehta:<\/span><\/p>\n

   The object associated with Section 138 along with other statutory provisions laid down in Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 is decreed upon.\u00a0 The Supreme Court passed a verdict saying that whatever offences have been laid down in Section 138 are civil by nature. Further, the provision of compoundable offence is present in Negotiable Instruments (Amendments and Miscellaneous Provision Act), 2002\u00a0 which does require the consent of both the parties in concern. In the present case, as the company was willing to compensate the complainant, the court in the sake of proper delivery of justice thought of discharging the accused for the complainant was compensated with the amount that was necessary to be provided with.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

   Mayawati v. Yogesh Kumar Gosain (2017):<\/span><\/p>\n

   The verdict of the Delhi High Court in this approached a new pathway called the alternate dispute resolution mechanism to decide offences labelled under Section 138 of the Act which is criminally compoundable by nature. This verdict brought not only a change in dealing with the Act but also a change for the Indian judicial system. It further highlighted that as the offences labelled under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are different from other criminal offences, they can be given a preference to be resolved differently and in a speedy way.<\/span><\/p>\n

   LAND ACQUISITION ACT<\/span><\/h1>\n

   Land Acquisition Officer, A.P v. Ravi Santosh Reddy (2016):<\/span><\/p>\n

   In a 1987 land acquisition case, the Andhra Pradesh Government pursued the landowner into court for 20 years to challenge his Rs. 50,000 claims. Meanwhile, the claimant died in the middle of this lengthy legal process. When the state government sought the Supreme Court, the deceased\u2019s heirs failed to attend. However, in May 2016, the Supreme Court issued a decision in which it slammed the state government for abusing the legal system.<\/span>Balakrishnan v. UOI (2017)<\/span><\/p>\n

   Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal (2020)<\/span><\/p>\n

   The landowners contended in Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal that acquisitions made under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 had lapsed and that new processes under the Land Acquisition Act of 2013 were required.<\/span><\/p>\n

   The Supreme Court declared in this significant decision that outstanding cases under the 2013 Act will expire under two conditions, and the acquisition procedure will have to be restarted. The Supreme Court declared that new procedures under the Land Acquisition Act of 2013 will be required only if the following conditions are met:<\/span><\/p>\n

   \n
   • Possession of land has not happened.<\/span><\/li>\n
   • Landowners have not received compensation. According to the court, payment of compensation includes not only money given to landowners or put in court, but also money deposited in a government treasury. This implies that, even if the compensation payment was deposited with the government, the 2013 law will not <\/span>Chennai Metro case<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

     INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW<\/span><\/h1>\n

     Bajaj Electricals Limited vs. Gourav Bajaj & Anr:<\/span><\/p>\n

     The Plaintiff was a part of the renowned Bajaj industry conglomerate, and had electrical stores of the same brand name.\u00a0 Besides this, the Defendant used the expression \u201cPowered by: BAJAJ\u201d. The Plaintiff established their right over the name by proving that \u2018Bajaj\u2019 had been legally granted the status of a well-known trademark, and thus the Defendant had no right to use it. The Court passed an interim injunction against the use of the trademark in the store names as well as the domain name of the Defendant.<\/span><\/p>\n

     Marico Limited vs. Abhijeet Bhansali:<\/span><\/p>\n

     The Defendant herein was a social media influencer, who also operated a YouTube channel of his own. In a video posted on the channel, the Defendant made denigrating comments about Parachute Coconut Oil, which is the Plaintiff Company\u2019s product. The Court relied on the Trademarks Act, 1999 and in a clear interpretation of Section 29 of the Act, held that the Defendant was guilty of infringing the trademark of the Plaintiff by using it without prior authorization in his video. Hence, an interim injunction was passed against the Defendant along with an order for the removal of the impugned video.<\/span><\/p>\n

     Sameer Wadekar & Anr. vs. Netflix Entertainment Services Pvt. Ltd & Ors:<\/span><\/p>\n

     The present suit was instituted upon the basis of an allegation that the Defendant had copied the literary work of the Plaintiff and converted the same into a web series without his consent, thereby infringing his copyright. The Bombay High Court scrutinized both the works, and concluded that the similarities were not sufficient to declare the web series as a copy of the literary work of the Plaintiff. Thus the application for injunction was dismissed and the release of the web series was permitted.<\/span><\/p>\n

     Star India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Moviestrunk.com & Ors.:<\/span><\/p>\n

     The Plaintiff herein was a film production and distribution company, whereas the Defendants operated several online streaming websites. The present suit was filed against the illegal streaming of one of the Plaintiff\u2019s films on the Defendants\u2019 websites, which amounted to copyright infringement. The Court held that it was a clear case of infringement against the Defendants who had made the film available to the public without the knowledge and consent of the Plaintiff. Hence the Court granted an injunction and also awarded suitable damages.<\/span><\/p>\n

     International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) vs. Iskcon Apparel Pvt. Ltd & Ors.:<\/span><\/p>\n

     The present suit was filed before the Bombay High Court for alleged trademark infringement and passing off. Plaintiff contended that by selling garments under the name of \u2018Iskcon\u2019, the Defendant was infringing their trademark and attempting to pass off his brand as being associated with the Plaintiff group. The Plaintiff also sought to get their mark declared as a well-known trademark.<\/span><\/p>\n

     The Court declared that in the present scenario, a clear case of trademark infringement had been established, and hence ordered the Defendants to refrain using the Plaintiff\u2019s mark. It was also concluded that the Plaintiff\u2019s mark satisfied all the statutory requirements of a well-known trademark, and thus the Court declared it as such.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

     CONSTITUTIONAL LAW A.K. Gopalan Case (1950):\u00a0 SC contended that there was no violation of Fundamental Rights enshrined in Articles 13, 19, 21 and 22 under the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act if the detention was as per the procedure established by law. Here, the SC took a narrow view of Article 21.\u00a0 Shankari Prasad […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":26,"featured_media":27175,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"default","ast-site-content-layout":"","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"footnotes":""},"categories":[29],"tags":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27176"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/26"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=27176"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27176\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":27182,"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27176\/revisions\/27182"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/27175"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27176"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=27176"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawdiktat.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=27176"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}